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Social norms can interact with formal institutions in shaping women’s autonomy. We examine this 
question in the context of legal reforms and their differentiated impact on divorce and empowerment 
across traditional modes of post-marital cohabitation. Global evidence first shows that the degree of 
ancestral matrilocality (i.e. the practice of living with the bride’s relatives after marriage) correlates with 
contemporaneous opinions about gender role. This is especially the case in countries with low divorce 
rates such as Indonesia. We then exploit a policy experiment for this country, which exogenously 
fosters women’s access to justice and ability to divorce. We theoretically establish how women 
originating from matrilocal ethnic groups should respond to the reform compared to those from 
patrilocal ethnicities. We confirm the model predictions using a panel difference-in-difference 
approach: the former divorce more and, when in stable marriages, experience a significant 
improvement in well-being and empowerment. This result is consistently obtained for a broad range of 
outcomes including women’s health, fertility control, asset value, women’s and children’s well-being as 
well as women’s final say over key decisions. Modern legal reforms compound with ancestral norms 
and exacerbate potential inequalities between women of different ethnic origins. This conclusion calls 
for better tailored policies that can transcend cultural contexts and overcome the adherence to informal 
laws. 
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It is well established that the legal and institutional framework of a country can greatly con-
tribute to women’s autonomy (Duflo, 2012). In particular, changes in divorce laws and legal
rights can improve women’s empowerment within marriage (Voena, 2015). However, cultural
norms can mitigate policy effects, especially in the context of developing countries character-
ized by great ethnic diversity. Admittedly, traditional norms per se have garnered considerable
attention in both anthropological and economic studies, notably their association with gender-
related development outcomes.1 Yet, less is known about the way ancestral social norms interact
with formal institutions.
With this question in mind, some authors have examined the impact of large-scale development
policies depending on different cultural contexts stemming from ethnical diversity (Ashraf et al.,
2020; La Ferrara and Milazzo, 2017).2 The present paper contributes to this nascent litera-
ture by offering evidence on the role of matrilocality – the practice of living with or near the
bride’s parents after marriage – regarding the effectiveness of pro-women laws. We start with
a simple motivation: ancestral norms of post-marriage residence are still relevant today. Using
global variation, we find a strong association between the degree of ancestral matrilocality and
contemporaneous opinions about women’s autonomy. This is especially the case for countries
with a low access to divorce such as Indonesia. We then move to the context of this country.3
Comprising more than 300 different ethnic groups, it exhibits a wide heterogeneity in terms of
kinship norms, with large pockets of matrilocal communities (Rammohan and Robertson, 2012).
Ethnic-based customs, the so-called Adat system, still guide family life and often prevail over
religious and legal laws (Buttenheim and Nobles, 2009). In particular, contemporaneous atti-
tudes towards divorce and gender rights are strongly associated with traditional post-marriage
arrangements as prescribed by the local Adat.
To research what cultural norms imply for policy effectiveness in a context of pro-women legis-
1Jayachandran (2015) describes how various cultural practices – such as patrilocality, patrilinearity or the
payment of bride price or dowry – may affect women’s outcomes. Several studies examine in particular the effect
of bride price on early marriages (Corno et al., 2016) and women’s well-being (Lowes et al. (2017) or the effect
of matrilinearity on household cooperation and children’s outcomes (La Ferrara, 2007; Lowes, 2018). Recent
studies explore the origins of cultural norms using ethnic diversity (Alesina and Ferrara, 2005) – in particular
how socioeconomic conditions and agricultural practices may have shaped gender roles (Alesina et al., 2013;
Doepke and Tertilt, 2009; Alesina et al., 2016) and norms such as matrilinearity (BenYishay et al., 2017).
2Extending Duflo (2001), Ashraf et al. (2020) find that Indonesian ethnic groups that traditionally engage in
bride price payments at marriage increase female enrollment in response to a large school construction program.
La Ferrara and Milazzo (2017) study the introduction of quotas for the land that parents should devolve on
their children in Ghana and find a negative impact of the reform on educational outcome of boys originating
from matrilineal ethnic group. Hence, the effectiveness of development policy may strongly vary with traditional
rules or even crowd the practices of the norm in some cases (Bau, 2016).
3Despite recent improvements in women’s legal rights, Indonesia was ranked 110th by the United Nations
(Gender Inequality Index of 0.494) and 92nd by the World Economic Forum (Global Gender Gap Index of 0.681)
in 2015.
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lation, we exploit a series of country-wide reforms that have fostered women’s access to justice
and their ability to divorce in 2008-2010. A simple household model with limited commitment
and changes in outside options predicts that women of matrilocal tradition are more likely
to divorce and, when the marriage lasts, benefit from renegotiation. The natural experiment
allows us to test these predictions using difference-in-difference estimations with fixed effects
on the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS). We confirm that Indonesian women originating
from matrilocal ethnic groups are more responsive to the reform than those from patrilocal
ancestry. They tend to divorce more and, if remaining with their partner, experience a signifi-
cant improvement in their bargaining position and welfare, as shown through a broad array of
outcomes including health status, control over their own fertility, asset accumulation, own and
child well-being as well as final say over key life decisions.
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, we bring new evidence on the
role of access-to-justice legal reforms, and divorce-related laws, on marital breakdown, house-
holds’ intertemporal behavior and women’s empowerment. Most of this literature examines
how unilateral divorce, in Western countries, makes the threat of divorce credible and hence
possibly affects intra-household allocation during marriage. This type of mechanism is rarely
studied in the context of poorer countries, especially in muslim settings where divorce is not
common.4 We show that in the Indonesian case, a change in legal rights in favor of women can
be perceived as sufficiently effective – at least among ethnicities of matrilocal tradition – to
affect the probability of divorce and the degree of women’s empowerment. Second, the reform
examined in this paper is different from, and complementary to, the policies studied in related
contributions including educational programs in Ashraf et al. (2020) and wealth transmission
control in La Ferrara and Milazzo (2017). Legal laws are also important for they can be very
effective in changing people’s living arrangements. We show that they can pervade the private
sphere and influence intra-household mechanisms in some segments of the population. Third,
this paper is one of the few that test how the efficacy of pro-women policies can vary with cus-
toms. We use explicit measures of traditional norms about post-marriage residence to assess
the contribution of culture to the effectiveness of legal reforms. It turns out that legal reforms
cannot target the most disadvantaged women if policies are not better tailored to transcend
cultural contexts and overcome the adherence to informal laws.
2 Background on Social Norms and Legal Reforms
We provide some background on traditional residence norms and their correlation with women’s
empowerment using global evidence and a focus on Indonesia. The section ends with a descrip-
4Some evidence exists for middle income countries. Sun and Zhao (2016) document how China’s pro-women
divorce reform has empowered women within marriage and reduced health-damaging sex-selective abortion.
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tion of the reforms under study.
2.1 Traditional Norms and Female Empowerment: Global Evidence
Post-marital residence norms have long been emphasized by anthropologists and sociologists
as a social structure shaping household organisation. As such, different ethnic groups engage
in different practices, which have been categorized as follows: matrilocality (married couples
live with or near the bride’s family), patrilocality (they live with or near the groom’s family),
ambilocality (they can live with or near either spouse’s parents) and neolocality (they can set
their own household, i.e. the basis of most developed nations).
Traditional versus Actual Residence Norms and Women’s Outcomes. Many anthro-
pological and economic studies attribute lower education, a lower marriage age and low levels
of autonomy to women in groups adopting patrilocality.5 The basic explanation recalled by
Sundaram and Vanneman, 2008 pertains to the fact that parents are dissuaded from invest-
ing in their daughters’ education if they leave the home after marriage. Selective abortion in
East/South Asia and South Caucuses is also linked to the fact that daugthers in patrilocal
families cannot provide care once the parents are old (Ebenstein, 2014). Patrilocal contexts
may also increase husbands’ outside options due to the pressure exerted by the presence of their
own relatives on the wife. Yet, living with his or her relatives is not the only aspect affecting
spouses’ relative empowerment. More generally, matrilocality or patrilocality are salient fea-
tures of a broader ethnic diversity in family customs and gender roles. For this reason, we will
focus on the heterogeneity in terms of traditional rather than actual post-marriage residence
in our empirical approach. Another reason to choose traditional norms is that actual arrange-
ments may be highly correlated with a particular couple’s unobserved heterogeneity and, hence,
reflect more than what the norm entails.
Origins of Residence Norms. Several explanations have been given for the emergence of
residence norms. Patrilocality might have originated from a greater productive role attributed
to sons, from a larger bargaining power given to sons, or from the need to locate multiple
women within a husband’s household in a polygynous setup (Edlund, 2001). Botticini and
Siow, 2003 explain how patrilocal societies transfer wealth via dowries for their daughters and
via bequests for their sons in order to maintain the incentives of the latter to exert effort on the
family farm. Sons’ incentives may also depend on paternity uncertainty, which may be reduced
if their parents monitor the sexual behavior of the son’s wife, hence explaining how patrilineal
inheritance and patrilocal exogamy reinforce each other (Guha, 2010).
5This is the case for instance in Dyson and Moore (1983) for northern India, Garg and Morduch (1998)
for Ghana and, in the Indonesian context, Buttenheim and Nobles (2009), Rammohan and Johar (2009) and
Rammohan and Robertson (2012).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Average Effect
Relative Matrilocality -0.167* -0.205** 0.322** 0.457* 0.116*** 0.005** 0.140**
(0.089) (0.085) (0.160) (0.244) (0.033) (0.002) (0.060)
R-squared 0.618 0.636 0.580 0.764 0.496 0.204 0.252
Heterogenous Effect by Countries’ Intensity of Divorce
(Relative Matri.) × 1st Tertile -0.359*** -0.390*** 0.495** 0.604** 0.163*** 0.009** 0.179**
(0.109) (0.113) (0.214) (0.255) (0.043) (0.004) (0.069)
(Relative Matri.) × 2nd Tertile -0.054 -0.071 0.200 0.423 0.082** 0.004 0.126*
(0.117) (0.111) (0.192) (0.279) (0.035) (0.003) (0.063)
(Relative Matri.) × 3rd Tertile -0.025 -0.133 0.254 0.211 0.084** -0.001 0.048
(0.126) (0.148) (0.423) (0.531) (0.035) (0.003) (0.070)
R-squared 0.673 0.685 0.592 0.768 0.544 0.259 0.294
Tertile 1 = Tertile 2 (p-value) 0.023 0.024 0.215 0.497 0.030 0.230 0.376
Tertile 2 = Tertile 3 (p-value) 0.045 0.181 0.647 0.450 0.044 0.053 0.060
Observations 73 72 71 73 70 70 51
Mean Dep. Var. 1.891 2.370 8.093 4.762 0.643 0.972 0.347
Country-level linear estimates of contemporary women’s outcomes on the relative degree of matrilocality, calculated as the proportion of citizens from ancestral
matrilocality minus the proportion from ancestral patrilocality (source: Alesina et al., 2013). Outcomes in columns 1-4 are drawn from the World Value Surveys
(WVS) modules on self-report attitudes towards gender roles, asking whether: (1) men have more rights to a job when jobs are scarce (from 1-disagree to
3-agree), (2) men make better business executives (from 1-disagree to 4-agree), (3) gender equality as essential characteristics of democracy (approval on a
1-10 scale), (4) divorce justifiable (approval on a 1-10 scale). Outcomes in column 5-7 are indices ranging from 0 to 1, drawn from the 2016 World Economic
Forum (columns 5-6) and the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (column 7). They include: (5) an index based on the participation gap, the remuneration gap
and the advancement gap, (6) an index measuring gender difference in sex ratio at birth and in healthy life expectancy, (7) the percentage of firms with some
female ownership (country surveys conducted over 2003-2010). All the regressions include country-level controls: log GDP/capita and its square, proportion
of pre-industrial plough use, ancestral suitability for agriculture, fraction of ancestral land that was tropical or subtropical, ancestral domestication of large
animals, and estimations based on the WVS also include average respondants’ characteristics (gender, age, age squared and education). In the lower panel,
we provide the same estimates conditional on the intensity of divorce in the country (tertiles of the country proportion of divorced-separated respondants).
Indonesia is ranked 8th from the bottom and hence below to the first tertile. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Significance levels: * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Equality tests show that in 5/7 cases, the first tertile is significantly different from the rest of the distribution.
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Overall, ancestral residence norms carry a lot of information about gender rights and roles
within an ethnic group, as the emergence of norms has been closely associated with the values
driving inheritance, marriage age or the timing of fertility.
Global Evidence. We also provide further motivation for studying the importance of ancestral
residence norms. In the upper panel of Table 1, we use country variation of indices drawn from
the World Value Surveys, the World Economic Forum and the World Bank Enterprise Surveys
on attitudes towards gender rights and women’s outcomes (economic activity, health, female
firm ownership). We regress these indices on the country-level relative prevalence of traditional
matrilocality and a broad set of controls. We find a systematic relation between pro-women
outcomes and the ancestral degree of matrilocality. In the lower panel, we show that these
results are mainly driven by countries in the lowest tertile of the divorce rate distribution.
In words, ethnic cultural diversity transpires in terms of gender attitudes in more traditional
countries such as Indonesia (this country is ranked 8th from the bottom of the divorce intensity
distribution).
2.2 Traditional Residence Norms: the Indonesian Context
Against this background, Indonesia is a particularly relevant field of investigation given its
extraordinary ethnic diversity and the noticeable variety of social norms that derive from it.
Three points should be made.
First, residence norms are not geographically polarized. This can be seen on the map of
Figure 1, where we show the location of villages interviewed in the IFLS and the prevailing
residence norm of each village. In most of the regions, villages of both patrilocal and matrilocal
ancestries are surveyed. This is good news because otherwise, a different exposure to the
reform under study could simply be related to spatial heterogeneity (or other aspects related to
living in specific areas). We will actually explore this type of confounders more deeply later by
additionally controlling in our estimations for the distance to cities where the new legal rights
can be exerted.
Second, we have discussed the relevance of traditional norms in general and stress here the
role of informal laws (Adat) in the Indonesian context. They shape many aspects of family
life and are historically associated with ethnic differences in family-related behavior including
marriage, inheritance, land-holding and dispute resolution. In particular, divorce and polygyny
are relevant cases of tensions between Adat customs, religious laws and state laws that have
emerged during the colonial period and still persist (Buttenheim and Nobles, 2009). Traditional
residence norms, as the salient part of Adat rules, will be exploited in our empirical analysis
as they potentially filter the effect of legal reforms while reflecting couples’ attitude towards
divorce. It is possible that women of matrilocal tradition benefit more from the new legal
6
Figure 1: Village-level Traditional Post-Marital Residence (IFLS data)
support and the increased possibility of divorce.6
Finally, we document a similar type of association between ancestral matrilocality and attitudes
towards gender roles as we have done using cross-country variation. We rely on the description of
traditional norms by village-level Adat experts as provided in the 1997 IFLS. Simple estimations
reported in Appendix Table B1 show that in case of divorce, villages of matrilocal traditions
tend to favor women: the divorce ruling more often takes place in a religious/civil court, the
husband has less often the right to claim pre-marriage assets or assets acquired since marriage,
young children are less likely to follow the husband or his relatives. Note however that divorce is
relatively infrequent so that there is no clear pattern of matrilocal-advantage in marriage during
the pre-reform years (2000 and 2007 IFLS), at least concerning the empowerment outcomes
used in our double difference approach, as will be seen thereafter (and also found in Levine and
Kevane 2003). In fact, a clear advantage for women of matrilocal tradition will appear after
the reforms.
2.3 National Access-to-Justice Strategy: a Natural Experiment
Indonesia is characterized by an Islamic justice system in which religious courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over cases where the parties are Muslim and which involve marriage-related cases
(1974 Marriage Law). These cases mostly concern divorce and related matters including prop-
erty division, child custody or spousal maintenance. Given the prevalence of Islam, around
98% of divorces are pronounced by religious courts (the remaining cases are heard by general
courts). A critical aspect is the ability to exercise one’s rights. In particular, women’s access to
6In a study of Adat marriage patterns among the Sasak, Grace (2004) contends that interpretations of both
Islamic law and state law related to marriage are often shaped by local Adat. Consistently, an access-to-justice
reform may not be appreciated equally by women of different ethnic traditions.
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justice is positively related to gender equity developments (Alfitri, 2011), especially by making
them more assertive about their right to divorce. However, these rights may be constrained by
a lack of information, by the cost of court cases (half of Indonesia citizens live below $2 a day)
or by the social consequences for women who institute divorce proceedings through the formal
legal system. These conclusions have been reached by the ‘Access and Equity’ study supported
by the Family Court of Australia, AusAID and other stakeholds.
In this context, and following this study, the Indonesian government has launched the National
‘Access to Justice’ Strategy during 2008-2010. This program aimed at increasing access to the
courts for women and disadvantaged groups (Sumner et al., 2011). It comprises three pillars.
First, in 2008 and 2009, the Justice for the Poor scheme has been put in place, financially
supported by AusAID, the Family Court of Australia and the World Bank. To alleviate the
financial constraint of poor households, it has substantially increased religious courts’ budgets
in order to waive legal fees. It has also increased the capacities of circuit courts, namely courts
travelling to subdistricts in order to hold hearings for family law cases in rural and remote
areas. Second, the laws 48, 49 and 50 on Judicial Authority and General/Religious Courts were
passed in 2009, requiring both types of courts to provide an extensive range of services that
could improve women’s access to courts (court fee waivers, legal aid services, legal assistance
to clients who cannot afford lawyers). Finally, the Presidential regulation n.5 passed in 2010
has provided additional budget for fee-waiver schemes, circuit courts and legal aid services.
The effect of this series of reforms has been documented in several reports, showing a significant
increase in the ability of women, the poor or those living in remote areas to access courts and
exercise their rights. Sumner et al. (2011) explain that the awareness and public confidence in
the legal system has also increased dramatically. The authors show that the access to courts
has substantially increased, i.e. the number of people accessing religious courts through fee
waiver (resp. circuit courts) has been multiplied by 20 (resp. 6) in 2011 compared to 2007.
As illustrated in Figure 2, an increase in divorce is observed around the time of the reform.
Maybe more impressive is the rise in divorce cases initiated by the wives, which exceed 70%
of all divorces in the recent years. Finally, courting reforms have also helped women in case
of domestic violence and to break cycles of illegal marriage, divorce or births. That is, they
can legally register births, marriages and divorces, which are important steps to establish their
legal identity and to enforce their rights, for instance their entitlement to poverty alleviation
or healthcare programs for themselves or their children (Sumner and Lindsey, 2011). Since
these evolutions improve their outside options in case of divorce, the reforms may also improve
women’s and children’s situation within marriage, as we shall see.
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Figure 2: Divorce Trends around Reform Time
3 Theoretical Framework
We suggest a conceptual framework to pinpoint the main mechanisms at stake. It is based on
a simple dynamic model with limited commitment (Mazzocco, 2007; Chiappori and Mazzocco,
2019), more specifically derived from Voena (2015) and aimed to elucidate the channels through
which traditional norms and divorce laws may affect the probability of divorce and the position
of women in marriage. We consider a household made of two individuals j = H,W , husband H
and wife W , who are married at time 1 and live T periods. At each period t, they must decide
whether to stay married, and how to allocate resources between the private consumption of
each spouse and savings. The household, denoted h = M,P , can either belong to a matrilocal
M or a patrilocal P ethnic group.
3.1 Preferences
Both spouses derive utility from their own private consumption cjh and joint consumption of a










with ρ > 1 and E(k) ≥ 1, implying household returns to scale, and xjh the contribution of j to
the public good. Adding a time subscript, we write spouse j’s utility functions under marriage
9















t ) = ujh(cjht , xjht )
with χjh denoting the subjective taste for marriage of each spouse, which may evolve over
time. Assume that taste shocks follow a random walk stochastic process, which captures the
persistence in taste for the current marriage:
χjht = χjht−1 + εjht and χjh1 = εjh1
with εjht i.i.d. as N(0, σ2). We now introduce here the main dimension of heterogeneity between
matrilocal and patrilocal ethnic groups. We assume patrilocal women to suffer from a stronger
social stigma from divorce in the household they live in. Formally:
Assumption I: χWM1 < χWP1 .
We also assume that men suffer from a lower social stigma than women, irrespective of the
ethnic group they belong to:
Assumption II: χHM1 = χHP1 < χWM1 .
3.2 Income Dynamics and Budget Constraints
Assume spouses have a permanent income yjh that may be modified in each period t by a random
shock so that the income dynamic of each spouse follow a random walk process (Voena, 2015):
yjht = yjht−1 + ζjht and yjh1 = ζjh1
with ζjht i.i.d. as N(0, σ2). The two groups have the same expected total permanent household
income.
For both ethnic groups the household budget constraint in each period is as follows:
Aht+1 − (1 + rt)Aht + cHht + xHht + cWht + xWht ≤ yHht + yWht .
We discuss the problem of divorce for a community property regime where assets are shared
equally between spouses, but we can extend result for context in which title-based and equitable
sharing are applied. In a community property regime, assets accumulation is defined jointly
between spouses. Under divorce, the budget constraint is modified as follows:
Ajht+1 − (1 + rt)Ajht + cjht + xjht ≤ yjht .
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3.3 Problem of Divorce before the Reform
To understand how the reform has modified access to divorce, we make the following assump-
tion:
Assumption III: Before the reform, the household probability to access divorce, denoted d,
is equal to 0.
A zero d means that the spouses have no possibility to exit marriage. This approxima-
tion fits well the reality of many couples in Indonesia and the very low divorce rate re-
called earlier.7 At each period t, the couple’s problem is determined by the state variables
ωt = {Aht , yHht , yHht , χHht , χWht } that maximize the following value function:
Vt(ωt) = γHh[uHh(cHht , Qht ) + χHht ] + γWh[uWh(cWht , Qht ) + χWht ] + βE[Vt+1(ωt+1)]
where γHh and γWh are the Pareto weights of husband and wife respectively, which are deter-
mined by social norms and do not change with outside options.
3.4 Problem of Divorce after the Reform
We assume that the reform increases the accessibility of divorce equally for matrilocal and
patrilocal women. Formally:
Assumption IV: After reform, the household probability to access divorce d is randomly
drawn from the following probability distribution:
dh =

1 with prob. p
0 with prob. 1− p.
When d = 1, spouses have the possibility to exit marriage. Since we are in a limited commitment
set-up, we assume that divorce can be initiated unilaterally by each spouse. Thus, in each
period, the household will stay in the marital union if there exists an allocation that makes
both spouses better-off than the divorce allocation. In this case, the within-period Pareto
weight (bargaining power) also enters the vector of state variables that now becomes ωt =
{Aht , yHht , yWht , χHht , χWht , γ̃Hht , γ̃Wht } where for each spouse γ̃
jh
t+1 = γ̃jht +µjht . The parameter µjht





t ) + βE[V
jh
t+1(ωt+1)|(ωt)] ≥ V jhDivorced(ωt)
7This assumption also implies that women’s position in marriage before the reform does not differ between
couples of matrilocal versus patrilocal tradition. Again, this fact is verified empirically (there is little correlation
between women’s outcomes and matrilocal ancestry in 2007, i.e. before the reform, as detailed in Table B2).
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Combining assumptions I-IV, we can formulate the following predictions:
Prediction 1. For households that have access to divorce after the reform, matrilocal women
have in expectation a higher probability of divorcing than patrilocal women.
Prediction 2. For households that have access to divorce after the reform, E(γ̃WMt ) > E(γ̃WPt ),
i.e. women from matrilocal origins have in expectation a higher bargaining power in marriage
than patrilocal women.
Proofs are provided in Appendix D. These two predictions are precisely what we aim to test
with the difference-in-difference analysis that follows.
4 Empirical Approach
4.1 Data
IFLS Data. The empirical analysis draws on data from the Indonesia Familiy Life Survey
(IFLS). It is particularly well-suited for our study, as it contains extensive socioeconomic data
at the individual level (including information on individuals’ ethnicity, marital history, health
status and subjective well-being) and at household level (including decision-making questions,
household composition and economy). IFLS samples also contain village-level information,
notably the ethnic composition and prevalent kinship norms (including inheritance and post-
marital residence norms), as provided by Adat experts or community leaders. Even though
repeated cross-sections would be sufficient for our double difference analysis, the panel dimen-
sion is appreciable as it allows us to control for household fixed effects. Moreover, the IFLS
benefits from an exceptionally low attrition rate so the sample remains representative at every
wave.8
Selection. We select non-polygamous households and exclude ‘mixed’ couples, i.e. when
spouses originate from two different ethnic groups with different post-marital residence norms.
We focus on the 2007 and 2014 waves, two years surrounding the Access-to-Justice reforms
(2008-10). Our main analysis considers women’s well-being and empowerment outcomes within
8The IFLS is based on an initial sample representing about 83% of the Indonesian population living in 13 of
the 27 Indonesian provinces in 1993. Extensive efforts were provided to track respondants when collecting data
in each of the five waves (1993, 1997, 2000, 2007 and 2014) to reach a recontact rate of 92% in the last wave
(Strauss et al., 2016).
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stable marriages (i.e. not remarried) over 2007-2014. To check the parallel trend assumption
over the pre-reform period (2000-2007), we will use couples married from 2000 to 2014 with the
same partner (or, alternatively, couples married in both 2000 and 2007 with the same partner).
We will also use a double difference approach to characterize the effect of the reform on women’s
divorce rates. In that case, we will use different alternative samples as described hereafter.
Outcome Variables. We consider a series of outcomes pertaining to a women’s empower-
ment and to her or a children’s well-being, as reported in the IFLS. Well-being variables include
a dummy indicating whether a woman experienced at least one morbidity symptom in the last
4 weeks preceeding the survey, the woman’s number of living births, the adequacy of her own
and her children’s standard of living and food consumption on 1-3 scales, and the value of assets
owned by the wife (in thousands of rupiah).9 Empowerment variables are dummies indicating
whether the wife and/or her potential relatives have the final say regarding key dimensions of
household choices including contraception and large household expenditures.10
Treatment Intensity: Ethnicities’ Traditional Post-marital Residence. As previously
discussed, we focus on ethnic heterogeneity in terms of traditional residence norms. The tra-
ditional norm of each ethnicity is not explicitly reported but can be proxied following a simple
methodology, as already suggested by Buttenheim and Nobles (2009). The IFLS contains infor-
mation on individual ethnicity and we can categorize villages according to their main ethnicity.
For each group of villages of the same prevailing ethnicity, we observe the distribution of Adat
experts’ answer to the question about “where the newly married couple lives after wedding
according to the traditional law”, as reported in Table A1. To attribute to each woman the
traditional residence norm of her ethnicity, we retain the modal answer. Note that it is sys-
tematically matrilocality or patrilocality (rather than neolocality or ambilocality), so that an
ethnic group’s traditional norm will be a binary information as indicated in the last column.
We obtain a proportion of about 83% (17%) individuals with a matrilocal (patrilocal) ethnic
heritage. As reported in Table A2, we find that the traditional residence norm is still a very
significant predictor of a couple’s actual household composition in 2014.11
9Other child outcomes could be considered, for instance the gender of the last child as a proxy for son
preferences (and the stopping rule when couple obtain the desired number of boys, see Jayachandran and
Kuziemko 2011).
10These dimensions seem relevant and have been used in previous studies on muslim countries – see for
instance Sadania (2016) or Lépine and Strobl (2013) for Egypt and Senegal respectively. Other aspects are
deemed less relevant, such as decisions upon daily purchase and cooking, since they may reflect delegation of
responsibility rather than women’s genuine autonomy (Baland et al., 2020).
11A possible alternative strategy would consist in instrumenting the actual residence choice by the traditional
norm. Table A2 shows that a first-stage estimation of traditional matrilocality on presence of wife’s relatives in
the household (plus standard controls) yields a F-statistic well above 10. We do not follow this path because, as
explained in sections 2.1 and 2.2, we want to use the traditional norm directly, for it carries more information
than actual residence choices on gender rights and roles within an ethnic group.
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Descriptive Statistics and Raw Difference-in-Differences. Descriptive statistics for
couples from matrilocal or patrilocal ethnic traditions are reported in Table A3 for both 2007
and 2014. The upper panel describes standard socio-demographic characteristics (the rest of
the table focuses on additional controls used in the robustness checks analysis and commented
later). This set of characteristics, denoted Xit hereafter, is important as it will be used as con-
trols in the estimations. It includes dummies for being a university graduate, currently working,
living in rural areas, being muslim as well as for age groups (using 5-year steps) to capture life
cycle effects. We see that women of ethnic matrilocal customs tend to work less and be more of-
ten urban and muslim than their patrilocal counterparts. These differences seem to be constant
over time. The last column reports the time difference of the matrilocal-patrilocal difference,
i.e. a raw difference-in-difference (DD) calculations on these characteristics. It confirms that
there is no significant change over time, which is reassuring on the absence of confounding
factors. For instance, the reform could affect muslims more than non-muslims, which would be
what we capture by confronting matrilocal and patrilocal groups. While it does not seem to be
the case, our estimations will control for the whole set of characteristics and their differentiated
effect over time.
Regarding outcomes, statistics are reported in Table A4. We distinguish well-being variables
from final say measures on key decisions. There is little difference between matrilocal and
patrilocal groups in the pre-reform period (this is the case for 8 out of 9 variables and a F-
test cannot reject the equality of both sets of mean values). Interestingly, strong differences
emerge in the end period, both in terms of well-being and empowerment. The raw DD actually
indicates that relative to the pre-reform period, the situation of women of matrilocal tradition
significantly improves: less morbidity symptoms, more control over fertility (both number of
birth and final say on contraception), better living conditions and nutrition for them and
their children, more asset accumulation, more control over large household expenditure. DD
estimations will refine these raw calculations but both sets of results are consistent (we will
verify that raw DD and actual DD estimates are in line both in terms of significance and
orders of magnitude). We also carry out simple estimations of these outcomes on a dummy for
belonging to an ethnicity of matrilocal tradition (and additional controls as described in the
double difference approach), for each year separately. Results in Table B2 show that there is
not much difference between ethnic groups in 2007 but very strong differences in 2014, after
the reforms.
4.2 Empirical Approach
Difference-in-Difference Estimations. We denote yi the outcome (female well-being/empowerment
measures), for a woman in household i observed at time t. The treatment variable,Matrilocali,
14
is equal to 1 (0) if the woman’s ethnic group is traditionally matrilocal (patrilocal). Impor-
tantly, nothing precludes women of patrilocal tradition to be affected by the reform. Hence,
what our difference-in-difference approach captures is a potential difference in the intensity of
treatment between the two groups. Nonetheless, we will comment on first-difference effects of
the reform regarding women of patrilocal tradition, which give very suggestive indication of
the potential direction of the reform overall. Given that we pool only two years, time effects
are simply denoted by Postt, which is equal to 1 for the period following the Access-to-Justice
reform (year 2014) and 0 for the base period (year 2007). The estimation conducted on pooled
years is described by the following equation:
yit = α + βPostt ×Matrilocali + γPostt + δXit + ηPostt ×Xit + φi + εit. (1)
The coefficient γ on Postt captures the time trend in the outcome, which includes the effects
of the reforms common to all the Indonesian ethnicities, as identified on the households of
patrilocal tradition (the ‘untreated’). The coefficient β on the interaction term is the difference-
in-difference estimator, representing the extra effect of belonging to an ethnicity of matrilocal
tradition (the ‘treated’) once the reforms are in place. Household fixed effects φi implicitly
pick the average time-invariant difference between ethnic groups (and notably the difference
between matrilocal and patrilocal traditions, i.e. Matrilocali is absorbed by the fixed effects).
CovariatesXit may improve the precision of the model but also control for the difference in time-
varying observables between matrilocal and patrilocal ethnic groups, as previously discussed.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the women’s village of origin to correct for potential
geographical correlation in error terms.12
Identification Issues. First, in the context of a DD analysis, treated and control groups are
not randomly chosen and may be very different. We have seen that women of matrilocal ethnic
groups work significantly less, are more often muslim and are more urban. Hence, the measured
effect might be due to different time trends in these variables – for instance differentiated
responses to the reform between muslim and non-muslim – rather than between traditional
residence norms. We have partly ruled out this possibility when presenting the descriptive
statistics for Xit. However, we also include interactions Postt × Xit to completely account
for (possibly confounding) time trends pertaining to specific religion or geographical groups in
the DD estimation. Second, another usual concern is the potential presence of unobservables,
which would affect the outcome trends of matrilocal and patrilocal ethnic groups differently.
12Villages of origin are where the woman’s household lived in the first wave of the IFLS (1993). It seems
reasonable to use such a variable for it is time-invariant in our estimations and presumably closer to the time
of marriage.
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A minimum requirement in this respect will consist in checking whether the outcomes of the
two groups show parallel trend prior to the reforms under study, namely between 2000 and
2007. Third, we have extensively checked that throughout the 2007-2014 period, there was
no major (potentially confounding) policy or social change that could have affected women’s
empowerment in a differentiated way between couples of patrilocal versus matrilocal origins.
Fourth, we consider the possibility of endogeneous policy changes (Bertrand et al., 2004; Besley
and Case, 2000). This would be the case if the series of reforms was triggered by a pre-
existing rise in power by women who could best benefit from policy changes, namely women
of matrilocal ethnicities. Several points mitigate this concen: (i) the Access-to-Justice strategy
was implemented at a national level, not targeting any particular social or ethnic groups; (ii)
it was prompted by international influence, notably that of the Family Court of Australia,
AusAID and other stakeholds, as previously described; (iii) common trends in the pre-reform
period will guarantee that there is a priori no differentiated trends in empowerment between
ethnic groups that would eventually lead to the reforms.
5 Results
5.1 Effect of the Reforms on Divorce
A preliminary set of results pertains to the effect of the reform on divorce. We have conjectured
that an enhanced access to justice may increase the mere possibility of divorce and that it would
occur relatively more among ethnicities of matrilocal tradition. We check this prediction with
estimations reported in Table 2. We first apply a difference-in-difference approach to women’s
marital status for the pooled years 2007 and 2014, using the same specification as outlined in
the previous section. To assess the mere transitions from marriage to divorce in both years,
we first consider a sample of women previously married (model 1). Alternatively, we keep the
whole sample of women observed in both 2007 and 2014 but selecting only those married or
divorced, i.e. excluding the singles and widowed (model 2). We also combine both selection
criteria (model 3) or keep the first one while considering a status as divorced or separated
(model 4). All the models leads to a significant effect of the reform on the probability of
divorce for women of matrilocal ethnicities compared to patrilocal counterparts. Relative to
the pre-reform divorce rate in the control group, the effect represents an increase of 40%-66%
in divorce rates across the different models. The coefficient on Post shows no first-difference
effect of the reform for the control group, suggesting that in the absence of counteracting time
changes, the burden of divorce must have remained heavy for women of patrilocal heritage.
We also estimate a simple difference model for the year 2014, using the subsample of women
married in 2007. We consider both outcomes: divorce (model 5) or divorce/separation (model
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6). Being from a matrilocal tradition leads again to a significant relative impact of the reforms
and of a very similar magnitude compared to DD estimations. In Appendix Table C1, we test
the parallel trend assumption for the DD or a direct change in marital breakdown for the simple
difference approach. We use a placebo sample pooling years 2000-2007 and the very same types
of specifications. In all of them, placebo estimates are not statistically different from zero, i.e.
there is no sign of specific trends in divorce among ethnic groups of matrilocal tradition before
the reforms.
5.2 Main Results: Effect of the Reforms on Women’s Outcomes
Previous results establish that by fostering access to justice, the reform has significantly in-
creased divorce rates among women in matrilocal ethnicities, verifying the first theoretical
prediction. The second prediction entails a relative gain in bargaining power among women
of matrilocal groups (section 3). This result stems both from a more frequent renegotiation
among matrilocal ethnic groups and because of a selection effect (matrilocals divorce more so
that those who stay in marriage have obtained favorable renegotiations, cf. appendix D).
We check this prediction formally with the DD approach laid out in equation (1). Our baseline
estimations are conducted on stable marriages (spouses observed married in both 2007 and 2014)
but we also provide results for a broader selection hereafter. Baseline results are presented in
Table 3. For most of the outcomes, the coefficient on Post is not statistically different from
zero. It suggests that, if no other forces affect women’s position within the private sphere over
time, women of patrilocal ethnicities do not benefit much from the reform. In contrast, the
DD estimates confirm that matrilocal women experience a relative improvement in their living
conditions. As seen in descriptive statistics, their morbidity symptoms decrease, the number of
births is reduced, women’s and children’s standard of living and food consumption improve, the
wives’ asset accumulation increases, and the final say over contraception and large expenditure
is in progress. The magnitude of the effect, relative to the pre-reform control group outcome, is
substantial. In absolute values, it ranges from an increase of 7-10% in mothers and children’s
standard of living and nutrition up to a near doubling of the final say variables (+85% and
104% on decisions upon contraception and large household expenditures respectively).13
13Relative effects tend to be large given that we start from very low rates of female say before the reform. For
instance, decisions upon large expenditure are broadly in the hands of men. As indicated in Table A4, women
of matrilocal (patrilocal) ethnicities have the final say in this domain in only 6.4% (5.3%) of the cases in 2007.
DD results indicate a relative increase of 5.5 percentage points for the matrilocals.
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Table 2: Effect of Legal Reforms on Women’s Divorce Probability



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 0.0225 0.00575 0.0164 0.000335
(0.0231) (0.00907) (0.0160) (0.0297)
Post × Matrilocal 0.0103** 0.0125*** 0.0107** 0.0122**
(0.00434) (0.00472) (0.00486) (0.00512)
Matrilocal 0.00879*** 0.00928***
(0.00287) (0.00336)
Rel. effect 66.0% 40.2% 63.3% 53.0% 56.3 % 40.3%
Observations 12,752 17,390 10,892 12,752 8,801 8,801
R-squared 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.005
Clusters 318 319 318 318 319 319
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Linear estimations of women’s divorce status (dummy for divorced, or divorced/separated). We apply the
difference-in-difference approach to a selection of women observed in both 2007 and 2014, who were married in
1997 and/or 2000 (columns 1, 3 and 4); and a selection of women being married, divorced or separated in 2007
and 2014 (columns 2 and 3). For them, Post is equal to 1 for observations in 2014 (post-reform) and 0 in 2007
(pre-reform). We also estimate the potential increase in divorce using women observed in 2014 who were married
in 2007 (columns 5 and 6). Matrilocal is a dummy indicating whether an individual belongs to a traditionally
matrilocal ethnic group. Estimations include individual FE (absorbing Matrilocal and muslim - column 1-4),
time-varying controls (women’s characteristics: university graduate, currently working, living in rural areas and
age group dummies using 5-year steps), + a muslim dummy in columns 5 and 6, and interactions between Post
and controls (including Post interacted with a muslim dummy) in columns 1-4 as indicated. Standard errors are
reported in brackets and clustered at village of origin level. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3: Effect of Legal Reforms on Women’s Well-Being and Empowerment (Stable Couples, 2007-14)

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Post 1.327** 2.577 0.467 -0.563 -0.0617 0.267 10,203 0.321 0.0863
(0.529) (3.411) (0.505) (0.401) (0.431) (0.565) (33,483) (0.239) (0.140)
Post × Matrilocal -0.0887*** -0.233** 0.191*** 0.188*** 0.152*** 0.140*** 10,689** 0.163*** 0.0549***
(0.0319) (0.0915) (0.0536) (0.0507) (0.0541) (0.0500) (5,286) (0.0333) (0.0159)
Relative effect -12.6% -7.6% 9.7% 9.3% 7.6% 6.9% 47.1% 85.3% 103.6%
Observations 11,840 11,490 11,546 11,548 6,730 6,728 11,870 10,884 10,884
R-squared 0.047 0.348 0.043 0.059 0.039 0.073 0.083 0.065 0.088
Clusters 318 318 318 318 316 316 318 317 317
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Difference-in-difference estimations of well-being and empowerment indicators on a sample of stable couples surveyed in both 2007 and 2014. Post is equal
to 1 for 2014 (post-reform) and 0 for 2007 (pre-reform). Matrilocal is a dummy indicating whether an individual belongs to a traditionally matrilocal ethnic
group. All estimations include household FE (absorbing Matrilocal and muslim), time-varying controls (women’s and husband’s characteristics: university
graduate, currently working, living in rural areas and age group dummies using 5-year steps) and interactions between Post and controls (including Post
interacted with a muslim dummy). Well-being outcomes: dummy indicating whether a woman experienced at least one morbidity symptom in the last 4
weeks preceeding the survey (‘Morbidity Symptoms’), the woman’s number of living births (‘Number of Births’), the adequacy of her standard of living
and food consumption on a 1-3 scale (‘Standard of living’ and ‘Food consumption’), the adequacy of her children’s standard of living and food consumption
on 1-3 scales (‘Children’s std. of living’ and ‘Children’s food conso.’), and the value of assets owned by the wife (in thousands of rupiah). Empowerment
outcomes: dummies indicating whether the wife and/or her potential relatives have the final say (while the husband does not have any say) regarding key
dimensions of household choices including contraception and large household expenditures . The relative effect is calculated in % of mean outcome for
patrilocal group in 2007 (pre-reform). Standard errors are reported in brackets and clustered at village of origin level. Significance levels: * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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These magnitudes are very much in line with the raw DD calculations presented above. For
instance, the raw DD for the women’s living standard of (.150) is of a similar order as the DD
estimate (.190). It is also similar to the difference in the matrilocal effect in 2014 compared to
that effect in 2007 in the cross-sectional estimations of Table B2 (-.084-.107=.191). The latter
comparison boils down to a DD on stable couples 2007-2014 but ignoring the panel dimension
and household fixed effects. For a robustness check and to verify that our results are not
associated with the specific focus on stable couples, we also run DD estimation on repeated
cross-sections for 2007 and 2014 whereby the only selection criteria is to focus on married
women. As can be seen in Table B3, results are again similar to the fixed-effect DD estimates
(for instance, .203 in our example on women’s living standards).14
5.3 Robustness Checks, Heterogeneity and Interpretations
Common Trends. For both well-being and empowerment measures, common trends are
verified in placebo estimations reported in Table C2. With one exception, placebo estimates
obtained over the pre-reform period 2000-2007 are insignificant. We also conduct an extensive
series of sensitivity checks. We focus hereafter on two robustness analyses on the sensitivity to
model specification and to the definitions of empowerment outcomes.
Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Pathways. We check if our results are sensitivite to
the set of controls included in the model. This is important because some variables, such
as being muslim or rural, are highly correlated with traditional matrilocality and may be
seen as the pathway through which the reform impacts upon women’s conditions. In our
descriptive statistic analysis, we have partly addressed this concern, showing that the main
characteristics have not changed differently between matrilocal and patrilocal ethnic groups
over time. Nonetheless, we check whether our DD estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of
Postt ×Xit terms. Table C3 reports the relative effects from alternative DD estimations. The
first row reproduces our benchmark estimates. The second row shows the series of estimates
from a model where Postt×Xit are fully withdrawn. Relative effects change quantitatively for
some of the outcomes but the order of magnitude is broadly preserved and our conclusions are
unchanged. Women of matrilocal ethnic groups are more often muslim and urban than their
14Note that in additional, unreported estimations, we also test the effect of the reform on female labor market
participation and find no differential effect among women of matrilocal ancestry. Admittedly, it is unclear
which effect to expect. An increased risk of divorce may benefit to women in stable marriage and increase their
leisure time – this is the finding of Voena (2015) for women in US states that shift to unilateral divorce, when
property is divided equally. Alternatively, the risk of divorce may also push them to take up a job as a security
in case of divorce, which is particularly true when female participation is low (see Bargain et al. 2012 in the
context of divorce legalization). In the case of Indonesia, the pre-reform participation rate of about 50% was not
particularly low compared to other muslim countries. Moreover, work is not necessarily seen as an insurance
against poverty in case of divorce, since women’s activities are typically informal and bring only complementary
income (Verick, 2018).
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patrilocal counterparts. Removing only Postt × Rurali hardly affects baseline estimates (3rd
row). Excluding Postt ×Muslimi in the 4th row leads to some variation (as in the second
row) but does not fundamentally change our results – the baseline effects of the reform are not
driven by different time trends between muslims and non-muslims.
In addition, we also include new controls to the model. Javanese represent the main ethnic
group and account for 56.5% of matrilocal individuals in our sample. To check whether specific
time trends in this group may drive our results, we include Postt × Javanesei in the model:
results are barely changed (5th row). Alternatively, we run our baseline specification on a
sample excluding the javanese (6th row): despite a sharp reduction in sample size, we find very
similar results compared to the baseline. Finally, couples of mixed ethnicity are more often
represented among matrilocal couples. We explicitly control for Postt×Mixed Ethnicityi (7th
row). Finally, geographical polarization of certain ethnic groups could also be envisaged as a
potential alternative explanation to our results. We have previously checked that ethnicities of
matrilocal tradition do not necessarily live closer to the capital of the district, where religious
and civil courts are located. Moreover, we have also documented the fact that part of the
reform consisted in increasing the frequency of ‘circuit courts’ visiting people in remote areas.
Nonetheless, we also provide additional estimations where we now control for Postt × Closei
with the Closei dummy indicating whether the household lives in the two first tertiles of the
distance to the district capital. Results are reported in the upper panel of Table 4, which is
dedicated to a complete analysis on the role of distance. This check shows no major difference
with the baseline estimates.
Sensitivity Analysis on Empowerment Measures. Two outcomes correspond to final
say measures pertaining to key decisions that may not be associated to delegation and rather
interpreted as genuine autonomy for women. We provide some sensitivity checks regarding
their definition and measure. For both types of decisions, Table C4 first reproduces the baseline
estimates (columns 1 and 5). They are obtained for final say outcomes defined as dummies
equal to 1 if the wife and/or her relatives decide (while the husband does not have any say),
0 otherwise. We then show results corresponding to a more restrictive definition whereby
empowerment means that the wife decides alone (columns 2 and 6). This is an interesting check
given the fact that our main source of heterogeneity pertains to traditions regarding coresidence
with spouses’ relatives. We find hardly any change compared to the initial estimates. Next, we
address the fact that final say outcomes are recorded by the husband. It may vary compared
to the wife’s answer about who decides on each item in the household. The heterogeneity can
go both ways. Our baseline may understate women’s decision power if men do not recognize
when their wife has the say. Inversely, empowerment may be more firmly established when
the husband admits that she is the decision maker in a given domain. We simply reestimate
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the model for outcomes based on the wife’s answers (columns 3 and 7). Estimates are reduced
by around a third but remain very significant. The last set of results combine both variants
(columns 4 and 8) and leads to the same conclusions.
Heterogeneity We finally derive heterogeneous effects by interacting the treatment variable
with key characteristics (such as religion). Unreported estimations show no particular pattern
in general but one dimension comes out quite interestingly: the distance to the capital of the
local district. Results are reported in Table 4. We have already commented on the upper part
where we check that our estimates are not affected by potentially different time trends for those
living with an easier access to religious/civil courts, which would confound our interpretation if
women of matrilocal traditions systematically lived nearer to the district capital.15 The lower
panel of this table suggests heterogeneous effects of the reform. We interact Post×Matrilocal
with ‘close’ and ‘far’ dummies defined as belonging to a village located in the two first and
in the third tertiles of distance to the district capital respectively. For almost all outcomes
(except wife’s assets value and final say on contraception), the effect of the reform is larger for
those living further away. Reported t-tests do not reject equality between distance groups in
general (it does for children’s food consumption) but this pattern is intriguing. In fact, if we
take into account structural differences between groups – for instance the fact that women’s
decision power on contraception is smaller in far away villages – then we yield contrasted relative
effects that are systematically larger (except for wife’s assets value) for women living far from
administrative centers.16 These results are purely suggestive but may indicate that the set of
reforms tends to benefit poor villager women more, possibly as an effect of circuit courts, which
especially help those in remote regions, or the reduced cost of legal procedures through the
court fee-waivers.
15Note that the sample is reduced by around 20% due to the fact that distance information is available only
for those who lives in the village of origin. Results in the upper panel of Table 4 show the robustness of our
results not only to the control for Post× Close but also to the use of this smaller sample.
16Relative effects are calculated as the DD estimate relative to mean pre-reform control group outcomes while
distinguishing according to distance to district capital.
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Table 4: Heterogenous Effect of the Reform according to the Distance to District Capital

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Average Effect (Controlling for Post × Close)
Post × Matrilocal -0.0821** -0.248** 0.197*** 0.201*** 0.181*** 0.140** 11,265* 0.186*** 0.0612***
(0.0335) (0.106) (0.0631) (0.0570) (0.0646) (0.0646) (5,738) (0.0365) (0.0169)
Relative effect -11.8% -7.4% 10.0% 10.0% 9.0% 6.9% 54.7% 93.9% 139.1%
Observations 8,564 8,228 8,310 8,310 4,444 4,444 8,566 7,910 7,910
R-squared 0.045 0.304 0.046 0.054 0.054 0.069 0.086 0.073 0.096
Clusters 314 314 314 314 302 302 314 314 314
Heterogenous Effect
Post × Matri. × Close -0.0752* -0.226* 0.170** 0.195*** 0.144* 0.0734 16,119** 0.203*** 0.0507**
(0.0400) (0.130) (0.0662) (0.0617) (0.0762) (0.0704) (7,840) (0.0394) (0.0218)
Post × Matri. × Far -0.0924* -0.279 0.236** 0.210** 0.237*** 0.239*** 4,093 0.161*** 0.0763***
(0.0482) (0.175) (0.102) (0.0862) (0.0807) (0.0862) (5,375) (0.0593) (0.0234)
Relative effect:
Close -10.1% -6.8% 8.6% 9.5% 7.1% 3.6% 61.1% 87.9% 126.2%
Far -14.5% -8.2% 12% 10.5% 11.8% 11.8% 30% 101.3% 159.7%
Observations 8,564 8,228 8,310 8,310 4,444 4,444 8,566 7,910 7,910
R-squared 0.045 0.304 0.046 0.054 0.054 0.071 0.086 0.074 0.097
Clusters 314 314 314 314 302 302 314 314 314
T-Test Equal. (p-val.) 0.765 0.806 0.549 0.872 0.310 0.086 0.139 0.513 0.399
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × Close Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DID estimations on a sample of stable couples surveyed in both 2007 and 2014. Post is equal to 1 for 2014 (post-reform) and 0 for 2007 (pre-reform). Outcomes
and ‘Matrilocal’ are defined in Table 3. Estimations include household FE (absorbing matrilocal and muslim dummies), controls defined in Table 3 and Post
interacted with ‘Close’, a dummy indicating individuals living close to the district capital (i.e. below the 2nd tertile of distance). ‘Far’ is a dummy indicating
individuals living far to the district capital (i.e. above the 2nd tertile of distance). The relative effect is calculated in % of mean outcome for patrilocal group
in 2007 (pre-reform) in each group of distance to district capital. Standard errors are reported in brackets and clustered at village of origin level. Significance
levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. T-test of equal treatment effects between individuals that are close and far from district capital (p-value).
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6 Conclusions
Social scientists increasingly recognize the role played by traditional norms in shaping individual
behavior and affecting economic development (Bank, 2015). Very recent studies actually show
that customs and social norms can strongly mitigate the impact of development programs
aimed at supporting disadvantaged groups such as women. This paper contributes to this
nascent literature by focusing on legal reforms, which may also promote access to justice and
embolden women in the exercise of their rights. We examine such a reform in the context of
Indonesia, where ethnic heterogeneity in terms of gender roles transpires through the type of
traditional residence norms after marriage, namely matrilocality or patrilocality. We document
a strong global correlation between ancestral matrilocality and contemporaneous perceptions
about gender role, especially in low-divorce regions such as Indonesia. For this country, we
test whether deeply rooted norms also affect the exposure to the access-to-justice reform. We
find that women originating from customary matrilocal ethnic groups tend to divorce more
after the reform, relative to those from patrilocal tradition. It also appears that a subsequent
renegotiation takes place in stable marriages so that women from matrilocal groups experience
a significant increase in well-being and empowerment.17
Our study sheds some light on how cultural norms may interact with development policies and
legal changes. We suggest that the progressive legal reforms compound with social norm in
a way that make them effective only for some segments of the population, exacerbating the
inequality of treatment between women. This statement must slightly be nuanced, because
women of matrilocal tradition were not homogeneously better off than those from patrilocal
ethnicities before reform. Further analyses suggest that within the matrilocal groups, the most
disadvantaged women – living in remote areas and possibly in more conservative milieu – have
caught up a little in terms of empowerment, possibly thanks to specific features of the reform
such as circuit courts. Anyhow, the main implication of these results is that legal reforms can
exclude subpopulations who, because of social norms, cannot takeup legal services as much as
others. Policies, even when designed nationally, should be tailored to specific cultural contexts.
More specifically, our results contribute to the analysis of patrilocality per se, a norm that not
only reduces parents’ incentive to invest in daughters’ human capital, but also tends to have
persistent consequences by limiting women’s legal opportunities in the longer run.
17A potential limit of our empirical approach might be that the main measures under study took place between
2008 and 2010 while our post-reform period of observation is 2014. On the contrary, what we capture in our
estimates is likely to be a middle-term consequences of the reforms, which is arguably more interesting than
the situation in 2010. Indeed, it allows a possible period of adaptation for the new measures to become fully
operational and women to adapt to new legal opportunities.
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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics and Raw Difference-
in-Difference
Table A1: Determination of Traditional Post-Marital Residence Norm by Ethnicity
Ethnicity # Villages Matrilocal Patrilocal Ambi/Neolocal Norm
(%) (%) (%)
Jawa 109 64.22 17.43 18.35 Matrilocality
Sunda 40 67.50 7.50 25.00 Matrilocality
Bali 15 0.00 86.67 13.33 Patrilocality
Minang 12 100.00 0.00 0.00 Matrilocality
Banjar 10 100.00 0.00 0.00 Matrilocality
Betawi 10 70.00 20.00 10.00 Matrilocality
Bugis 9 77.78 11.11 11.11 Matrilocality
Sasak 9 0.00 100.00 0.00 Patrilocality
Madura 6 83.33 16.67 0.00 Matrilocality
Melayu 6 50.00 16.67 33.33 Matrilocality
Batak 4 25.00 75.00 0.00 Patrilocality
Bima 4 50.00 25.00 25.00 Matrilocality
Cirebon 2 100.00 0.00 0.00 Matrilocality
Makassar 2 100.00 0.00 0.00 Matrilocality
Nias 2 0.00 100.00 0.00 Patrilocality
Palembag 2 100.00 0.00 0.00 Matrilocality
South Sumatra 2 0.00 100.00 0.00 Patrilocality
Toraja 2 100.00 0.00 0.00 Matrilocality
Dayak 1 100.00 0.00 0.00 Matrilocality
Sumbawa 1 0.00 100.00 0.00 Patrilocality
Tionghoa 1 0.00 100.00 0.00 Patrilocality
Villages are grouped according to their dominant ethnic group. The table reports, for each
ethnic group, the distribution of villages’ traditional norms of post-marriage residence (ma-
trilocal, patrilocal or ambilocal/neolocal). Traditional norms are drawn from the declaration
of local Adat experts in the 1997 IFLS. We attribute a residence norm to each ethnic group,
defined as the modal answer from this distribution.
.
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Table A2: Traditional vs. Actual Matrilocality in Indonesia (2014)















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Matrilocality 0.0868*** -0.0439*** 0.0284*** -0.0129** 0.0412***
(0.0167) (0.0160) (0.00439) (0.00530) (0.00747)
Relative effect 84.3% -22.2% 136.8% -24.4% -128.7%
Ind. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,880 5,880 5,880 5,880 5,880
R-squared 0.039 0.047 0.057 0.062 0.029
F-stat 26.98 7.55 41.81 5.90 30.43
Clusters 318 318 318 318 318
Linear estimations of contemporaneous co-residence practices on “matrilocality”, i.e. a
dummy indicating that a woman belongs to a traditionally matrilocal ethnic group. De-
pendant variables include dummies for the presence of at least one wife’s relative in the
household, for the presence of at least one husband’s relative in the household, share
of wife’s relatives in the household, share of husband’s relatives in the household. ‘Gap
between Wife’s and Husband’s Relatives’ is the difference between the number of wife’s
relatives and the number of husband’s relatives in the household, divided by the size of
the household. All estimations control for women’s characteristics: university gratuate,
currently working, lives in a rural area, muslim, dummies for age category (by 5 years).
Standard errors clustered at the village of origin level in brackets. Significance levels: *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A3: Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables (Stable Couples, 2007-14)
2007 2014 Raw
Matri. Patri. Diff. Matri. Patri. Diff. DD
Wife’s Control Variables
Age Category 4.856 4.891 -0.035 6.174 6.169 0.005 0.040
(2.309) (2.354) (0.081) (2.307) (2.355) (0.081) (0.114)
University 0.066 0.065 0.001 0.078 0.079 -0.001 -0.002
(0.248) (0.246) (0.009) (0.268) (0.270) (0.009) (0.013)
Work 0.594 0.686 -0.091*** 0.667 0.741 -0.074*** 0.017
(0.491) (0.465) (0.017) (0.471) (0.438) (0.017) (0.023)
Rural 0.506 0.575 -0.069*** 0.417 0.518 -0.101*** -0.031
(0.500) (0.495) (0.017) (0.493) (0.500) (0.017) (0.024)
Muslim 0.969 0.540 0.429*** 0.969 0.540 0.429*** 0.000
(0.172) (0.499) (0.009) (0.172) (0.499) (0.009) (0.013)
Husband’s Control Variables
Age Category 5.797 5.679 0.117 7.111 6.965 0.146 0.029
(2.469) (2.481) (0.086) (2.486) (2.490) (0.086) (0.122)
University 0.073 0.097 -0.024** 0.082 0.109 -0.027*** -0.004
(0.261) (0.296) (0.010) (0.274) (0.312) (0.010) (0.013)
Work 0.956 0.958 -0.001 0.921 0.930 -0.009 -0.008
(0.204) (0.202) (0.008) (0.270) (0.255) (0.008) (0.012)
Rural 0.503 0.576 -0.073*** 0.414 0.519 -0.104*** -0.031
(0.500) (0.494) (0.017) (0.493) (0.500) (0.017) (0.024)
Muslim 0.968 0.537 0.431*** 0.968 0.537 0.431*** 0.000
(0.177) (0.499) (0.009) (0.177) (0.499) (0.009) (0.013)
Number of observations 4954 989 5943 4954 989 5943 11886
Prop. Matri/Patri 83.4% 16.6% 83.4% 16.6%
Additional Controls (Robustness Checks)
Close District Capital 0.575 0.545 0.030 0.575 0.545 0.030 0.000
(0.494) (0.498) (0.020) (0.494) (0.498) (0.020) (0.028)
Number of observations 3568 727 4295 3568 727 4295 8590
Javanese 0.565 0.000 0.565*** 0.565 0.000 0.565*** 0.000
(0.496) (0.000) (0.016) (0.496) (0.000) (0.016) (0.022)
Number of observations 4954 989 5943 4954 989 5943 11886
Mixed Ethnicity 0.132 0.015 0.117*** 0.132 0.015 0.117*** 0.000
(0.339) (0.122) (0.011) (0.340) (0.122) (0.011) (0.015)
Number of observations 4954 989 5943 4954 989 5943 11886
Statistics based on main DID sample in Table 3 (stable couples 2007-2014). Matri/patri: individual
of ethnicities from matrilocal/patrilocal tradition. Diff.: time difference, Raw DD: absolute difference-
in-difference (with ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels). Standard deviations are
reported in brackets in columns 1, 2, 4 and 5. Standard errors are reported in brackets in columns 3, 6
and 7.
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Table A4: Raw Difference-in-Differences of Outcome Variables (Stable Couples, 2007-14)
2007 2014 Raw
Matri. Patri. Diff. Matri. Patri. Diff. DD
Dep. Variables: Well-Being Measures
Morbidity Symptoms 0.761 0.705 0.055*** 0.843 0.839 0.004 -0.051***
(0.427) (0.456) (0.014) (0.363) (0.368) (0.014) (0.020)
Number of Births 2.628 3.085 -0.457*** 3.287 4.018 -0.731*** -0.274**
(2.300) (2.662) (0.084) (2.287) (2.838) (0.084) (0.119)
Standard of Living 1.948 1.976 -0.028 2.052 1.929 0.123*** 0.150***
(0.531) (0.592) (0.021) (0.656) (0.656) (0.021) (0.030)
Food Consumption 2.010 2.026 -0.016 2.148 2.018 0.130*** 0.146***
(0.511) (0.566) (0.020) (0.606) (0.636) (0.020) (0.028)
Ch. Std. of Living 2.027 2.010 0.016 2.134 2.009 0.126*** 0.109***
(0.530) (0.556) (0.027) (0.656) (0.656) (0.027) (0.039)
Ch. Food Conso. 2.066 2.033 0.033 2.226 2.091 0.135*** 0.102***
(0.516) (0.554) (0.026) (0.620) (0.645) (0.026) (0.037)
Wife Assets 25,218 22,697 2,521 54,433 40,960 13,473*** 10,952**
(58,793) (72,253) (3,540) (132,600) (116,218) (3,540) (5,006)
Dep. Variables: Empowerment (Final Say)
Contraception 0.191 0.191 0.000 0.342 0.220 0.122*** 0.122***
(0.393) (0.393) (0.016) (0.474) (0.415) (0.016) (0.022)
Large Expenditures 0.064 0.053 0.011 0.191 0.115 0.076*** 0.064***
(0.245) (0.224) (0.012) (0.393) (0.320) (0.012) (0.016)
Statistics based on main DID sample in Table 3 (stable couples 2007-2014). Matri/patri: individuals of eth-
nicities from matrilocal/patrilocal tradition. Diff.: time difference, Raw DD: absolute difference-in-difference
(with ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels). Standard deviations are reported in brackets in
columns 1, 2, 4 and 5. Standard errors are reported in brackets in columns 3, 6 and 7.
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Appendix B. Cross-Sectional Estimations (Correlations)
Table B1: Villages’ Post-Marriage Residence Norm and Divorce related Adat Traditional Norms
Divorce settled Husband takes Husband takes Young children
in religious all assets from all assets acquired live with the man
or civil courts before marriage during marriage or his parents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Matrilocal Village 0.102 -0.043 -0.056** -0.173***
(0.065) (0.027) (0.026) (0.046)
Patrilocal Village -0.247*** 0.064* 0.074** 0.252***
(0.071) (0.038) (0.037) (0.062)
Observations 247 247 249 249 249 249 249 249
R-squared 0.010 0.044 0.013 0.021 0.027 0.037 0.071 0.116
Village-level linear estimations of situations in case of divorce on either matrilocal or patrilocal traditional norm
of post-marriage residence. If matrilocal=1 (patrilocal=1), 0 corresponds to patrilocal (matrilocal), neolocal
and ambilocal. The norm is obtained from the Adat questionnaire (answers by Adat experts in each village)
in 1997 IFLS data. Columns 1 & 2: if a divorce happens, the decision-making process used in the divorce is
1: religious/civil courts or 0: family discussion. Columns 3 & 4: if a divorce occurs, 1: the husband has the
right to claim those assets that existed before marriage, 0 otherwise. Columns 5 & 6: if a divorce occurs, 1: the
husband has the right to claim those assets obtained since the couple was married, 0 otherwise. Columns 7 &
8: after a divorce, young children go 1: with the husband or husband’s parents, 0 otherwise. Robust standard
errors in brackets. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table B2: Correlations between Matrilocality and Women’s Well-Being and Empowerment (Stable Couples, 2007-14)

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: 2014
Matrilocal -0.00598 -0.900*** 0.108*** 0.119*** 0.116*** 0.118*** 14,495*** 0.129*** 0.0663***
(0.0164) (0.154) (0.0390) (0.0353) (0.0443) (0.0422) (5,033) (0.0275) (0.0185)
Observations 5,920 5,745 5,773 5,774 3,365 3,364 5,935 5,442 5,442
R-squared 0.018 0.201 0.075 0.078 0.072 0.093 0.080 0.027 0.022
Clusters 318 318 318 318 316 316 318 317 317
Panel B: 2007
Matrilocal 0.0880** -0.640*** -0.0847 -0.0691 -0.0375 -0.0239 3,725* -0.0301 0.0128
(0.0348) (0.114) (0.0607) (0.0538) (0.0631) (0.0580) (2,156) (0.0231) (0.0125))
Observations 5,920 5,745 5,773 5,774 3,365 3,364 5,935 5,442 5,442
R-squared 0.018 0.409 0.048 0.045 0.049 0.047 0.111 0.018 0.007
Clusters 318 318 318 318 316 316 318 317 317
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cross-sectional linear estimations of women’s well-being and empowerment outcomes (defined in the footnote of Table 3) on a matrilocal dummy
(indicating whether an individual belongs to a traditionally matrilocal ethnic group) as well as women’s and women’s spouse’s characteristics (university
graduate, currently working, living in rural areas, muslim and age group dummies using 5-year steps). Standard errors are reported in brackets and
clustered at village of origin level. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table B3: Effect of Legal Reforms on Women’s Well-Being and Empowerment (Pooled Cross-Sections)

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Post 0.212 3.255*** 0.624 1.590*** -0.706 -0.121 107,716*** 0.473 -0.0569
(0.585) (0.617) (0.496) (0.516) (0.480) (0.854) (35,631) (0.344) (0.101)
Post × Matrilocal -0.0809** 0.0605 0.203*** 0.201*** 0.189*** 0.194*** 6,514* 0.136*** 0.0437***
(0.0332) (0.0973) (0.0471) (0.0474) (0.0512) (0.0462) (3,571) (0.0299) (0.0125)
Relative effect -11,.5% 1.8% 10.4% 10% 9.4% 9.5% 28.5% 76.8% 79.5%
Observations 18,243 17,929 17,930 17,932 12,253 12,249 18,271 17,189 17,189
R-squared 0.029 0.377 0.073 0.087 0.087 0.103 0.098 0.045 0.043
Clusters 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Difference-in-difference estimations of well-being and empowerment indicators on a sample of couples surveyed in 2007 and couples surveyed in 2014
(pooled cross-sections). Post is equal to 1 for 2014 (post-reform) and 0 for 2007 (pre-reform). Matrilocal is a dummy indicating whether an individual
belongs to a traditionally matrilocal ethnic group. Outcomes are defined in Table 3. All estimations include controls defined in Table 3 + a dummy
indicating matrilocality, a dummy indicating muslim religion, a dummy indicating a spouse of muslim religion, as well as Post interacted with all these
controls. We report relative effects that are calculated in % of mean outcome for patrilocal group in 2007 (pre-reform). Standard errors are reported in
brackets and clustered at village of origin level. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Appendix C. Placebo and Specification Checks
Table C1: Women’s Divorce Probability: Placebo Estimations





























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 0.0117 0.0253 0.00916 0.0271
(0.0101) (0.0299) (0.0180) (0.0274)
Post × Matrilocal -0.00167 0.00589 -0.00180 -0.00763
(0.00483) (0.00615) (0.00546) (0.00603)
Matrilocal 0.00122 -0.00240
(0.00454) (0.00599)
Observations 10,772 13,790 9,524 10,772 7,147 7,147
R-squared 0.019 0.011 0.021 0.022 0.006 0.016
Clusters 320 320 320 320 320 320
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Linear estimations of women’s divorce status (dummy for divorced, or divorced/separated). We apply
the difference-in-difference approach to a selection of women observed in both 2000 and 2007, who were
married in 1997 (columns 1, 3 and 4); and a selection of women being married, divorced or separated
in 2000 and 2007 (columns 2 and 3). For them, Post is equal to 1 for observations in 2007 and 0 in
year 2000. We also estimate the potential increase in divorce using women observed in 2007 who were
married in 2000 (columns 5 and 6). Matrilocal is a dummy indicating whether an individual belongs to
a traditionally matrilocal ethnic group. Estimations include individual FE (absorbing Matrilocal and
muslim - column 1-4), time-varying controls (women’s characteristics: university graduate, currently
working, living in rural areas and age group dummies using 5-year steps), + a muslim dummy in
columns 5 and 6, and interactions between Post and controls (including Post interacted with a muslim
dummy) in columns 1-4 as indicated. Standard errors are reported in brackets and clustered at village
of origin level. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table C2: Well-Being and Empowerment (Stable Couples): Placebo Estimations

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Post -0.215 5.367 2.023** 1.018** -0.986* -0.385 60,677 0.483 0.556*
(0.293) (3.301) (0.833) (0.514) (0.592) (0.631) (42,050) (0.381) (0.333)
Post × Matrilocal 0.0396 -0.125 0.0704 0.0987 -0.00807 0.0601 2,353 0.00179 -0.0299*
(0.0391) (0.0807) (0.0762) (0.0717) (0.0716) (0.0708) (3,027) (0.0485) (0.0174)
Observations 6,640 6,358 6,438 6,436 2,586 2,584 6,642 6,084 6,084
R-squared 0.038 0.375 0.063 0.077 0.075 0.061 0.178 0.047 0.025
Clusters 317 317 316 316 293 293 317 316 316
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Placebo difference-in-difference estimations of well-being and empowerment indicators on a sample of stable couples (2000-2014) surveyed in both 2000
and 2007. Post is equal to 1 for 2007 and 0 for 2000. Other variables are described in Table 3. Estimations include household FE (absorbing Muslim),
basic controls, and control interactions with Post (including Post interacted with a musim dummy). Standard errors are reported in brackets and clustered
at village of origin level. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table C3: Effect of Legal Reforms on Women’s Well-Being and Empowerment: Robustness Checks

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Baseline
Rel. effect (%) -12.6*** -7.6** 9.7*** 9.3*** 7.6*** 6.9*** 47.1** 85.3*** 103.6***
Observations 11,840 11,490 11,546 11,548 6,730 6,728 11,870 10,884 10,884
No Post × Controls
Rel. effect (%) -7.0* -8.2*** 7.9*** 7.3*** 5.7*** 5.2** 47.2** 65.4*** 118.7***
Observations 11,840 11,490 11,546 11,548 6,730 6,728 11,870 10,884 10,884
No Post × Rural
Rel. effect (%) -12.7*** -7.6** 9.8*** 9.5*** 7.7*** 7.2*** 49.1** 86.4*** 109.4***
Observations 11,840 11,490 11,546 11,548 6,730 6,728 11,870 10,884 10,884
No Post × Muslim
Rel. effect (%) -6.6 -8.6*** 7.6*** 6.9*** 5.5** 4.3** 48.8** 66.0*** 111.9***
Observations 11,840 11,490 11,546 11,548 6,730 6,728 11,870 10,884 10,884
Controlling for Post × Javanese
Rel. effect (%) -13.4*** -6.5** 9.7*** 9.3*** 7.4** 6.7** 73.4*** 72.8*** 120.0***
Observations 11,840 11,490 11,546 11,548 6,730 6,728 11,870 10,884 10,884
Sample excluding Javanese
Rel. effect (%) -16.5*** -6.8** 10.7*** 10.2*** 7.7** 7.7*** 69.0** 83.2*** 122.8***
Observations 6,252 6,062 6,088 6,094 3,778 3,776 6,276 5,766 5,766
Controlling for Post × Mixed Ethnicity
Rel. effect (%) -12.4*** -7.7** 9.5*** 9.1*** 7.0*** 6.3** 44.1* 83.2*** 99.6***
Observations 11,840 11,490 11,546 11,548 6,730 6,728 11,870 10,884 10,884
Difference-in-difference estimations of well-being and empowerment indicators on a sample of stable couples surveyed in both 2007 and 2014. Outcomes
are defined in Table 3. All estimations include household FE (absorbing matrilocal and muslim) and controls defined in Table 3. Baseline is our main
specification in Table 3. In No Post × Controls we do not control for Post interacted with time varying controls anymore. In No Post × Rural we
do not control for Post interacted with ‘rural’ dummy anymore. In No Post × Muslim we do not control for Post interacted with ‘muslim’ dummy
anymore. In Controlling for Post × Javanese we additionally control for Post interacted with ‘javanese’, a dummy indicating an individual of
javanese ethnicity. In Sample excluding Javanese we exclude javanese individuals from our main sample. In Controlling for Post × Mixed
Ethnicity we additionally control for Post interacted with ‘mixed ethnicity’, a dummy indicating a couple with spouses of different ethnicities. We
report relative effects that are calculated in % of mean outcome for patrilocal group in 2007 (pre-reform). Standard errors are reported in brackets and
clustered at village of origin level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table C4: Effect on Empowerment: Alternative Definitions based on Final Say Answers


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post × Matrilocal 0.163*** 0.163*** 0.0956*** 0.0953*** 0.0549*** 0.0558*** 0.0373** 0.0401**
(0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0263) (0.0263) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0183) (0.0187)
Relative effect 85.3% 85.3% 64.2% 64.4% 103.6% 105.3% 69.1% 74.3%
Observations 10,884 10,884 11,384 11,384 10,884 10,884 11,384 11,384
R-squared 0.065 0.065 0.091 0.091 0.088 0.090 0.108 0.110
Clusters 317 317 318 318 317 317 318 318
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Difference-in-difference estimations of empowerment on a sample of stable couples surveyed in both 2007 and 2014. Post is equal
to 1 for 2014 (post-reform) and 0 for 2007 (pre-reform). Other variables are defined in Table 3. Estimations include household FE
(absorbing matrilocal and muslim), basic controls, all controls interacted with Post (including post interacted with a muslim dummy).
The baseline definition of empowerment outcomes relies on the husband’s answer and gives a value 1 if the wife and/or her relatives
present in the household have the say (while the husband does not have any say). Alternative definitions use the wife’s answer or
defined empowerment as her making the decision alone. Standard errors are reported in brackets and clustered at village of origin
level. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Appendix D. Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
We study the expected bargaining power and the probability of divorce of matrilocal and
patrilocal women. To solve the model, we follow the algorithm in Voena (2015). At each
period t, the spouses maximize the following value function:18
Vt(ωt) = γHht [uHh(cHht , Qht ) + χHht ] + γWht [uWh(cWht , Qht ) + χWht ] + βE[Vt+1(ωt+1)]
s.t.
Aht+1 − (1 + rt)Aht + cHht + xHht + cWht + xWht ≤ yHht + yWht
Once the within-marriage allocation is established, we can define V jhmarried,t(ωt) = u(c
∗j
t ;χjht ).
Then, the following algorithm applies:
1. if V jhmarried,t(ωt) ≥ V
jh
divorced,t(ωt) for both j = H,W , then V
jh
t+1(ωt) = V jhmarried,t(ωt) and the
couple remains married.
2. if V jhmarried,t(ωt) < V
jh
divorced,t(ωt) for both j = H,W , then V
jh
t+1(ωt) = V jhdivorced,t(ωt) and the
couple divorces.
3. V jhmarried,t(ωt) < V
jh
divorced,t(ωt) and V ihmarried,t(ωt) ≥ V ihdivorced,t(ωt) for j = H,W , i = H,W
and i! = j.
In case 3, the allocation shifts. A new marriage allocation is determined through the maximisa-
tion of the value function as defined above but with renegotiated bargaining weights γjht + µjht .
The µs are such that j stays in marriage, i.e. they are defined as Lagrangian multipliers of the
binding version of the participation constraint V jhmarried,t(ωt) ≥ V
jh
divorced,t(ωt), and that the value
of marriage for i is high enough after renegotiation. If no such changes in bargaining weights
can be found, the couple divorces.
Divorce occurs for two main reasons. First, one of the two spouses has a negative preference
shock for marriage, so that no internal allocation allows her/him to stay without making the
other spouse too worse off. Second, one of the spouses get an income shock so bad that the other
spouse, given his/her tastes for marriage, does not find optimal to stay in marriage anymore.
Renegotiation of the Pareto weights occur for very similar reasons, with the exception that they
could be driven also by spouses’ positive income shocks. Renegotiations occur in case 3 above
when there exist feasible allocations within marriage that allow the spouse who would like to
divorce to gain power without making the other spouse unwilling to stay.
Divorce. We study the wife’s incentives to divorce in terms of her and her husband’s marriage
preferences and their income at time t. For each combination of {yWht , χWht }, we can define
18The model is solved backward. In the final period T , the asset constraint is the following: AT +1 ≥ 0
39
a husband’s resource level yHht that makes the wife indifferent between staying and leaving.
This level is independent of the state realisation of the bargaining power, as redistribution may
occur as soon as divorce is preferable for at least one spouse.
Also, this yHht corresponds to a minimum level of wife’s resources share, associated with the
Pareto weight level τt = γWht + µWht , that she needs to reach not to divorce. If γWht + µWht ≥
τt, the wife accepts to stay married. Whether this bargaining weight is feasible depends on
the above mentioned parameters plus the husband preference parameters χHht . So for each
combination of state variables {yWht , yHht , χHht }, we can define a minimum level of taste for
marriage of the wife χWhdivorced,t below which divorce occurs.
We want to compare the probability of divorce and the expected bargaining power of matrilocal
and patrilocal women. Since the utility functions of the two types of women are assumed to
be the same, both women have the same taste for marriage threshold χWhdivorced,t, below which
they divorce. We then have to compare P (χWMt < χWMdivorced,t|Ωt) to P (χWPt < χWPdivorced,t|Ωt).
All the stochastic variables follow a random walk process. The income variables have the same
expected value and variance in both groups. The preference parameter of the husband has
the same distribution in both groups. What differs between group is the distribution of the
wife marriage parameter. In particular, at time t we have that χWMt ∼ N(χWM0 , tσ2) and
χWPt ∼ N(χWP0 , tσ2). To know who has the higher probability of divorce we compare the CDF
of the two distribution. Since χWM0 < χWP0 , it follows that ΦWMt > ΦWPt and matrilocal women
are expected to divorce more frequently in every period t. This leads to prediction 1.
Bargaining power. Similarly, we can study the evolution of bargaining power when the
couple stay married. Given a starting bargaining power γ0, renegotiations will occur each time
the existing bargaining power does not provide enough resources in marriage as compared to
divorce. From the wife’s point of view, for every γWht we can define a minimum level of taste
for marriage, χWhrenegotiation,t, given {yWht , yHht }, below which renegotiation occurs. Given the
distribution of χWht for matrilocal and patrilocal women h = M,P , renegotiation takes place
more often for matrilocal couples. Starting from γ0, the bargaining power of matrilocal women
will thus increase more often than for patrilocal ones.
However, this will in turn make the husbands of matrilocal women also willing to renegotiate
more, whenever their divorce constraint binds. Then, in the two groups, we can compute at
every t the probability that a woman accepts the husband’s renegotiation. For every realisation
of χHht < χHhrenegotiation,t, i.e. the husband threshold for renegotiation given {yWht , yHht }, the
couple will stay married if χWht > χWhdivorce,t. This will happen more often for patrilocal women
than matrilocal women, implying that patrilocal women will accept a deterioration of they
bargaining power, while matrilocal women will divorce. So, in expectation, the matrilocal
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